The Populist Performance:

How Trump Enacted the Immigration Crisis During the 2016 Presidential Campaign

Note: This Essay was written as part of my MSc in Comparative Politics (2017–18) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), for the ‘Populism’ Module.

Introduction

This essay attempts examine the role of crisis performance in relation to populism by using Moffit’s model in the context of contemporary populism, using Donald Trump’s rhetoric on immigration as a case study. For the sake of clarity, the essay is divided into three key parts: the conceptual framework, the theoretical framework and the discussion.

The conceptual framework attempts to give a brief overview of the highly contested definition of populism, followed by an analysis of the media’s role in the phenomenon of ‘mediatzation’. The first part concludes with a short biography of Donald Trump in the context of popular culture.

The second part strives to define both the concept of crisis and Moffit’s model for understanding the key role that crisis plays in contemporary populism. The theoretical framework will then be applied to the previously defined conceptual framework and subsequent case study.

Finally, the discussion will attempt to use both frameworks to analytically dissect Donald Trump’s performance of the migration crisis through the methodological lens of Moffit’s model.

Overall, the essay examines populism as a style of political performance, and how it can be partially identified by the way populists themselves manage the narrative of crises in order to pursue their agendas — as exemplified in the case study of Donald Trump.

Conceptual Framework:

Populism

Manuel Pedroso Marques encapsulates the lack of consensus over a single definition of populism, by claiming that “what exists are populisms” (Marques 2018:6). Such statement, transfers populism from a singular dimension to a plural one. Marques’s statement acknowledges the validity of the attempts of many within academic circles at defining the concept, while simultaneously seeing populism as a fluid concept which can be observed from several theoretical approaches.

In spite of said fluidity, there are some widely undisputed traits that can be pointed out when defining populism. The first is that ‘[p]opulism always refers to the people and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people” (Jagers et al. 2007:322). Meaning that populists place themselves in the position of both belonging to the people, and acting on their behalf. Moreover, the “people are subsequently contrasted with the elite, that is, those who threaten the purity and unity of the sovereign people” (Akkerman et al. 2013:1327).

Therefore, populists engage in a binary differentiation between the people and the elite, a people to whom the populist belongs and an elite which exists exteriorly and antagonistically to the people. This creates an “us” versus “them” rhetoric, which functions in a mutually exclusive manner. Put differently, the people (populists included) are those who are not the elite, and the elite are those who are not the people. What truly differentiates populists from mainstream politicians, is that the populist’s ‘people’ is only formed by a portion of the total population: those who support him.

The second trait lies in the existence of a “charismatic leader [who] wins broad, diffuse, yet intense support from such a largely unorganized mass by “representing” [the] people (…) and by promising to rescue them from crises, threats, and enemies” (Weyland 2001:14). This is partially because populism, being anti-elitist in nature, does not usually rely on an established voter-base in its attempt to appeal to the people’s support. A charismatic leader is capable of convincing supporters that he or she is capable of effectively navigating the elitist realm that is formal politics, while never becoming part of the elite him/herself.

The third aspect lies in the fact that beyond “being antielitist, populists are always antipluralist” (Müller 2016:3). This is due to the fact that, by only acknowledging one true people, the populist homogenises what he or she thinks should be a part of said people. Consequently, anyone who opposes or dissents from the populist’s views is automatically excluded from his or her concept of the people. Put differently, if the populist’s people were to ever materialise, it would be constituted solely by a population which thinks and acts in unison with regards to their unwavering support for the populist’s rule.

In sum, the three traits mentioned above can be identified in a conception of populism that transcends differing conceptualisations: populism requires an appeal to the people, which exists in direct opposition to the elites; populist leaders are charismatic; and, populism is inherently antipluralist in nature.

Since it is beyond the scope of this essay to make an attempt at either defining populism in any conclusive manner, or catalogue all its existing conceptualisations, this section started by outlining the basic common traits present across multiple conceptualizations of populism. Therefore, the following paragraphs present two different approaches to populism, in order to portray said plurality.

The first approach sees populism as an ideology that envisions society as segregated into “two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volontè-generale (general will of the people)” (Mudde 2004:544). This perspective attempts to elevate the aforementioned factors to an ideological height, which places the sovereign people’s will as the raison d’être of politics, a will which is opposed by the existing elites who must be combated.

Moreover, considering that ideology is seen “as a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values [that] has remained constant in political science over time” (Knight 2006:625) (and that populism manifested itself in both the right- and left-wings of the political spectrum), it has also been argued that populism is a ‘thin’ ideology. As Stanley puts it, populism’s “thin nature means that it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology” (Stanley 2008:95) due to its lack of ability to bring about any meaningful solutions to political problems. This means that as a ‘thin’ ideology populism can aggregate itself to ‘thick’ ideologies, in a symbiotic relationship where the former strengthens the latter, and the latter sustains the former.

In other words, populism can provide Socialism with an extra strength to its ideological framework without redefining it, while Socialism grants populism a strong ideological base to address the questions populism alone cannot.

This approach has been criticised mainly on the grounds that the appeal to the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite — one of populism’s main pillars — is less of an ideology and more of a “discourse, invoking the supremacy of popular sovereignty to claim that corrupt elites are defrauding ‘the People’ of their rightful political authority” (Aslanidis 2015:96). A narrative reminiscent of a David and Goliath storyline becomes apparent, especially if told by a good narrator (the charismatic leader). Therefore, this essay will not focus on populism as an ideology, but rather as a style, the definition of which concludes this section.

Populism as a political style moves beyond the previously mentioned rhetoric invocation of the people versus the elite and becomes materialised trough “the way that this appeal is shaped and delivered” (Moffit 2017:30). This style manifests itself in the way that “[p]opulists, often quite intentionally dress, look and sound different” (Bartlett 2017:168), a style which bestows upon them a spotlight attracted by their difference from mainstream politicians. In a summarised manner, there are three crucial features of the populist style: “appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’; ‘bad manners’; and, crisis, breakdown or threat” (Moffit 2017:29). These all amount to the creation of politics performed in a populist style, which, as will be explored in the latter sections, serve to gain media attention.

Media and Mediatization

The media’s role in politics, and in life, has long evolved from its primordial days of being a mere facilitator of communication. The increasing commercialization of the media, and its incessant pursuit of revenues (mainly in the form of advertisement) have led media outlets to dispute for audiences in a competitive market. The term mediation, “which refers in a neutral sense to any acts of intervening, conveying, or reconciling between different actors, collectives or institutions” (Mazzoleni et al. 1999:149), seems like a distant predecessor to today’s media environment. Instead, mediatization seems to better capture the essence of media’s role in society.

Newsworthiness, spectacle, and attention-grabbing content have come to define a media who is “ever more pressured by advertisers to reach large audiences and therefore increasingly focus on what ordinary citizens deem important” (Rooduijn 2014:728). Importance, here to be understood whether as an assault on viewer’s beliefs, or reconfirmation of them. It does not matter how, or why people buy in to certain outlets, all it matters is that they are numerous enough to be profitable.

Politics, consequently, becomes yet another product offered by the media to its consumers — alongside reality shows, sitcoms, and soap operas. And since politicians need to be featured in media outlets in order to reach their prospective constituents, they also need to present themselves as newsworthy. Therefore, mediatized politics emerge in the form of “politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interaction with mass media” (Mazzoleni et al. 1999:250). The need to create a spectacle, capable of competing with other commodities offered by the media, drives politicians to engage in mediatized performances. Performances which are meant to be understood as “an aesthetic experience, a type of production which excites, motivates and persuades its audience” (Bar-Lev et al. 2011:669).

Whether through the rhetorical or bodily language used in speeches, audio-visual constructions of scheduled events (e.g. rallies or conventions), or through their attires and symbolisms (e.g. lapel flag pin) politicians have to put on a show capable of catching the media’s (and their audiences by extension) gaze. The free publicity that is media coverage has made it explicitly clear that “[b]eing a political ‘pop-star’ or ‘media-icon’ makes it easier for leaders (…) to put on a show and adapt public presentations to the pop-culture-style presentations of media celebrities” (Mazzoleni 2008:56).

Overall, the evolution of the media from being a mediator of information to curator and purveyor of spectacles in exchange for profit affected how the dissemination of political information is conducted. The mediatization of politics led politicians to take notes from entertainers and celebrities on how to reach the media and its audiences, and therefore creating a hybrid form of political entertainment, performed on stages built to reach to mediatized masses.

The Tump Show

Donald Trump has been a part of American popular culture long before his debut in politics. Among other performances, Trump has been the host of reality game show The Apprentice, had cameo performances in movies such as Home Alone 2, or even appeared in a WWE’s wrestling match. Therefore, considering his status of celebrity-gone-politician, “he is better understood as an entertainer than a politician” (d’Ancona 2017:11).

As such, regardless of whatever one might think of Trump’s political skills, his transcendence from businessman to pop-culture icon showed that he understood to a certain extent how the media works. Politically, Trump knows that “[o]utrage sells, [and that] journalists are addicted to (…) his compelling outbursts” (Bartlett 2017:171); The relevance of such factor will become more evident in the coming sections.

Populism as a political style, then, becomes the most evident route for a character such as Trump, whose “mastery of conventional and digital media (…) helped drive his coverage to the nomination” (Wells et al. 2016:675) for the Republican Party’s candidacy for President of the United States.

Overall, what is important to take from this short overview of Donald Trump, is his ability to navigate the media. Trump’s knowledge of how to attract the media’s attention and use it to reach voters as if they were audiences to a show, has, to at least some extent, helped Trump gain support on his way to the White House.

Theoretical Framework

Crisis Performance

In line with the approach to populism as being a political style to be performed, Moffit highlighted the correlation between crisis and populism. Additionally, the author furthered his claim by outlining a useful model on how to assess such a relationship, which, in turn will be the theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis in the final section.

In order to critically engage with the aforementioned model, the concept of crisis should be clarified. Firstly, crises do not happen in a vacuum, they are rather built upon failure or failures; For example, an economic crisis, is truly a failure of the mechanisms (e.g. legislation) or actors (e.g. politicians or banks) responsible for the sustainable performance of the economy. Consequently, a crisis emerges when “failure is identified and widely perceived, (…) [and when] systemic failure has become politically and ideationally mediated” (Hay 1999:234).

Secondly, as hinted at already, crisis is a performative concept, which arises from the rhetorical aggregation of failures into a narrative aimed at reaching the masses. Therefore, if a crisis is successfully enacted it “becomes the discourse through which the disaggregated experiences of failure become narrated” (Hay 1995:68). This means that there may be ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ attempts at constructing a crisis based on existing failures. For example, if the economic markets show signs of failure, such can be arranged into a coherent narrative which aggregates the failure of the stock market to those of the banks, and ultimately to policy failures on behalf of the government.

On the other hand, if a crime is committed by a minority immigrant as an isolated incident, it becomes harder to manufacture a narrative that elevates such an event to the status of an immigration crisis, which once again could extend itself towards governments’ failure to control migratory influxes. In summary, as it will be evident in the discussion, populists can “frame a situation as a crisis, calling it an existential threat, because such crisis serves to legitimate populist governance” (Müller 2016:43).

With the concept of crisis defined, we now advance to outlining Moffit’s model of populism’s performance of crisis, which is constituted of six points: Identify failure; Elevate to the level of crisis by linking to a wider framework and adding a temporal dimension; Frame ‘the people’ versus those responsible for the crisis; Use media to propagate performance; Present simple solutions and strong leadership; and, Continue to propagate crisis (Moffit 2015:198).

The first step, Identify failure, is somewhat self-explanatory, and revolves around the task of focusing on a problematic factor that arose from some form of governmental (or other source) failure — this will prove to be “more successful if the chosen failure already has some political salience” (Moffit 2015:198).

The second step, implies that the highlighted failure is “locat[ed] within a wider structure or moral framework” (Moffit 2015:198), alongside being aggregated to other failures.

The third step is centred around a topic already widely discussed in this essay, the performance of a narrative that portrays the crisis through the rhetorical lens of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. This oppositional stance is framed as a crisis triggered by those responsible for it (the elite), as an assault on ‘the people’ affected by the crisis.

The fourth step also draws on another previously explored topic: that of enticing the media into propagating the populist’s performance of the crisis.

The fifth step, focuses on the way that populists present themselves as the strong, necessary option to combat the crisis, while simultaneously outlining a simplistic solution.

The final step consists of perpetuating the propagation of the crisis, by reinforcing its urgency, reframing its performance, or extending it towards new areas — For example, a financial crisis which could be framed mainly as affecting employment can also be reframed and extended towards education, pensions or any other areas of social life.

In summary, Moffit’s detailed model allows for a close and systematic inspection of how populists utilise failures to perform a crisis in an attempt to gain political ground over their mainstream counterparts.

Analysis

Performing the Mexican Crisis

“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. [sic] They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”

Donald Trump (Newsday 2016)

Donald Trump made this statement on June 16, 2015, upon announcing his candidacy for the Republican nomination for the US Presidential elections. The now President of the United States of America is widely accepted as being a populist, as such, his crisis performance will be assessed through Moffit’s model via the case study of illegal immigration, namely from Mexico.

Trump started identifying the failure (step one) long before officialising his bid for head of the Republican Party, when, for example, he shared the following on his Twitter account:

“The Mexican legal system is corrupt, as is much of Mexico. Pay me the money that is owed me now [sic] — and stop sending criminals over our border” (Reilly 2016).

In his statement Trump identifies the failure in containing the migration of ‘criminals’ into the US. In other words, those responsible for safeguarding the US against the entrance of dangerous outsiders, have failed.

Moreover, Trump claimed:

“Whether it’s dangerous materials being smuggled across the border, terrorists entering on visas or Americans losing their jobs to foreign workers, these are the problems we must now focus on fixing” (New York Times, 2016).

Such statement is representative of the second step of the model: elevate to the level of crisis by linking into a wider framework and adding a temporal dimension. This is achieved by broadening the failure of immigration control to issues that include illicit smuggling, terrorism, or job-losses (among others), and granting it a timeframe within which it needs to be solved: ‘Now’. Such step, as exemplified by Trump’s claims, “elevates the situation to one in which the crisis must be dealt with immediately, and decisions made in order to stave off the crisis” (Moffit 2015:201), while simultaneously framing it as a problem greater than just a permeable border.

Furthermore, step three (‘the people’ vs. the elite responsible for the crisis) can be exemplified by the following excerpt from a Trump speech:

“The fundamental problem with the immigration system in our country is that it serves the needs of wealthy donors, political activists and powerful politicians. Let me tell you who it doesn’t serve: it doesn’t serve you, the American people”

(Independent 2016).

Here the ‘American people’ are pitted against an elite invested in their own interests, which come directly at the expense of the people itself. This step functions as a way to introduce “‘the elite’ or ‘the Establishment’ that is the source of crisis, breakdown, corruption or dysfunctionality as opposed to ‘the people’ who in turn have been ‘let down’, ‘ripped off’, ‘fleeced’, rendered powerless, or badly governed” (Moffit 2017:44).

In addition, Trump has successfully enacted step four (use media to propagate performance), by making shocking and sweeping statements about Mexicans in highly mediatized settings such as press conferences or rallies. As exemplified by the opening quote of this section, Trump breaks with the ‘political correctness’ associated with mainstream politics and engages in a form of ‘shock-performance’ from which neither the media nor its audiences can turn away (either for agreeance or condemnation).

For the ever-increasing commercialised media, and especially for “rating-driven news outlets, the always-controversial Trump was the gift that kept giving” (Manza et al. 2017:119), since his style of politics attracted ratings, and consequently allowed him to spread his message far and wide. An observation supported by the fact that “Trump received around $5 billion in free media coverage over the election cycle as cable news gobbled up his headline-grabbing tweets and outlandish suggestions — twice the amount Hillary Clinton received” (Bartlett 2017:171).

Furthermore, Trump fulfilled the fifth step (Present simple solutions and strong leadership) by announcing his answer to the immigration crisis:

“I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I’ll build them very inexpensively, I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall”

(Time 2016).

Such a simplistic solution to a complex problem shows that Trump has a conceptually graspable plan to stop immigration (a wall is easy to visualize, both in its material form, and, theoretically, in its capacity to impede bodies from crossing). While also portraying “other politicians as self-interested and disengaged from the ‘real world’ — caught up with reviews, reports, community consultations, calls for tender and protracted implementation — rather than seeking to put a definitive end to the crisis” (Moffit 2015:205); a wall, unlike policy or complex infrastructure, is easy to portray as an effective solution.

Above all, by claiming simply and directly that he, Donald Trump, will be able to make another sovereign nation pay for his proposed solution, paints Trump in the light of a strong leader — for only a great leader could make another country yield to his own wishes, as enacted on behalf of the people.

Finally, the sixth step (continue to propagate the crisis) can be exemplified by Trump’s following statement:

“You know, if it gets a little boring, if I see people starting to sort of, maybe thinking about leaving, I can sort of tell the audience, I just say, ‘We will build the wall!’ and they go nuts”

(Penzenstadler 2016).

Such claim confirms Moffit’s view that populists, in an attempt to curb loss of interest on behalf of the media or its audiences, tend to “[switch] the notion of crisis that they employ” (Moffit 2015:207). This can be done by either redrawing the narrative or performance of the crisis, or, in Trump’s case, by associating the crisis with a fervent passion about its solution, which happens to be represented in the simplicity of a call to build a wall.

Overall, by following Moffit’s steps on how to perform a crisis, as exemplified through Donald Trump’s stance on immigration (with special focus on Mexico), the populist style becomes apparent as a viable tool to gain media attention, mass exposure, and ultimately support.

This can be argued as being a by-product of the mediatization of politics which has fostered an environment where a spectacularly “transgressive political style signals to the people that the populist politician will go to great lengths to protect her interests, even if it means bending or breaking the rules” (Oliver et al. 2016:191).

In addition, the performance of crisis, as exemplified trough the case study, shows that certain traits of populism can be methodically analysed, and as a consequence hopefully take a step towards achieving a more academically consensual definition of the political phenomenon.

Conclusion

The essay attempted to explore the role of crisis performance in contemporary populism. This was done by applying Moffit’s method to the case study of Donald Trump’s immigration claims.

In order to develop a concise argument, the essay was structured into separate parts: The first part focused on building a conceptual framework by briefly overviewing populism, the role of the media and mediatization — while also mentioning briefly Donald Trump’s background. The second part, defined a theoretical framework by exploring the concept of crisis alongside Moffit’s model for assessing the production of such; Finally, the third part attempted to bring together the previous sections into a coherent analysis of how crisis is performed by populists, as exemplified by the assessment of Donald Trump’s claims on immigration.

Overall, the essay made an attempt to depict populism as a political style with a varied repertoire of tactics. Of that repertoire, the creation, production, performance and spectacularising- of crisis is but one of the various tools available in the populist’s pursuit of power.

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